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The Role of Ideas in the China-India Water Dispute1 
 
 Both the Chinese and Indian governments have desecuritized their water dispute.2 
This contrasts with the securitization of most of the disputes between the two countries. Their 
border dispute, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama are painted as existential threats and accepted as 
such by both sides. The water dispute, mainly over the Yarlung Tsango/Brahmaputra River, 
lends itself to securitization as the “triggers for securitization”3 are present in the river basin. 
Both China and India are water-scarce, and the Brahmaputra River is prone to floods and 
droughts. Moreover, the water dispute is intertwined with their border dispute – the Yarlung 
Tsangpo crosses the border into Arunachal Pradesh, which is claimed by the Chinese and 
known as South Tibet in China. An asymmetrical relationship also exists between China and 
India, with China being the upstream riparian with a stronger economy and military, while 
India is the middle riparian and downstream to China. Under these asymmetrical conditions, 
incentives exist for both sides to securitize their dispute – for China to use water as leverage 
against India in border negotiations, and for India, as the weaker party, to use securitization 
as a tactic to gain attention and offset China’s greater aggregate power.4 Yet, the Chinese and 
Indian governments have made strenuous efforts to desecuritize water as an issue between 
them. Why is this the case? The puzzle deepens when one considers that water disputes 
around the world are mostly securitized – “perhaps the most obvious resource that is prone to 
securitization is transboundary water.”5 
	
1	This	is	a	latest	revised	manuscript.	For	the	final	and	citable	version	of	the	article,	please	refer	to	Ho,	Selina,	
Qian	 Neng,	 and	 Yan	 Yifei.	 "The	 Role	 of	 Ideas	 in	 the	 China–India	 Water	 Dispute."	 The	 Chinese	 Journal	 of	
International	 Politics	 12,	 no.	 2	 (2019):	 263-294,	 Available	 at:	 https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article-
abstract/12/2/263/5506588	
2	Biba	
3	See	 triggers	 for	 securitization	 in	 Itay	 Fischhendler,	 “The	 securitization	 of	 water	 discourse:	 theoretical	







 China-India relations have traditionally been analyzed in terms of power and material 
capabilities. Material conditions are seen as drivers of their relationship as both countries are 
rising powers and hence, assumed to be competitors for resources and influence.6 The basic 
premise of such arguments is that national interest is defined strictly in material terms. 
However, such a definition of national interest is too broad to be useful.7 China is said to 
desecuritize water disputes with its neighbors in order to lower tensions along its periphery so 
as to focus on economic growth and development.8 Specifically in the water dispute with 
India, China’s desecuritization moves are attributed to its desire to stabilize its southern 
periphery, expand bilateral trade and investment opportunities with India, and reduce India’s 
alignment with the United States.9 However, these motivations are so general that they are 
also applicable to China’s broader relations with India and yet, the border dispute, Tibet, and 
the Dalai Lama issue remain securitized.  
 Moreover, why would the Indian government desecuritize its water dispute with 
China when it has securitized its water disputes with its neighbors in South Asia? An 
explanation based on power differentials would suggest that India desecuritizes its water 
dispute with China so as not to provoke China, the more powerful state which dealt it a 
humiliating defeat in 1962. Such an explanation contradicts the fact that India has on 
occasion taken actions that are deemed provocative by the Chinese, such as refusing to 
support the Belt and Road Initiative and sending troops to stop Chinese infrastructure 
construction in Doklam, Bhutan.10  
	
6		
7	Jutta	Weldes,	“Constructing	National	 Interests,”	European	Journal	of	 International	Relations,	Vol.	2,	 Issue	3	
(1996),	p.	279.	
8	Sebastian	 Biba,	 …,	 p.32	 ;	 Li	 Zhifei,	 “Water	 Resource	 Diplomacy:	 A	 New	 Topic	 in	 Constructing	 China’s	






 The conditions for desecuritization of the water dispute needs to be better explained. 
Solely focusing on the material and power differential aspects of upstream-downstream 
relations misses out a critical element of how interest is constructed – the role of ideas.11 We 
argue that ideas, beliefs, and perceptions shape interest and state behavior.  To our knowledge, 
the paper is the first systematic enquiry into the ideas held by Chinese and Indian experts at 
both central and local levels and across public, private and non-governmental sectors. Using 
the Q methodology which is increasingly widely used as a quantitative measure of 
perceptions and beliefs, not only is it able to uncover in detail various aspects of ideas, such 
as central/ local government priorities, perceptions on India-China relations and collaboration 
and so on, but the Q method also allows different aspects of ideas to be presented in relation 
to one another in terms of both the degree and the significance of (dis)agreement. As such, 
the result presents a systematic overview that is also highly nuanced. 
The perceptions and ideas that emerge from our Q survey focused on three main 
issues: collaboration, development, and threat perceptions. The results of the Q survey are 
corroborated with the views presented in scholarly articles on the water dispute. Together, 
they reveal the debates surrounding a set of ideas and views among policy/expert 
communities in China and India on how the two countries should manage their dispute.  
 These debates help account for the desecuritization narrative in the China-India water 
dispute. Among Chinese respondents, there was a prominent view that displayed significant 
sensitivity to Indian concerns and which emphasized the need to reduce Indian threat 
perception. They underscored the importance of building trust on both sides. This view helps 
account for the desecuritization narrative on the part of the Chinese. It contradicts the 





the weaker side. 12  On the Indian side, the Q survey revealed that the Indian central 
government could be motivated to desecuritize because they themselves are also the targets 
of the securitization narrative of local politicians and activists in the Indian northeast.  
  The findings of the Q survey also contribute to the debate on the implications of 
desecuritization on cooperation. The conventional view is that securitization is negative for 
cooperation “as it leads to the taking of extreme, competitive measures or the hardening of 
stances.”13 Conversely, desecuritization is seen as leading to greater cooperation. However, 
as more recent scholarship suggests desecuritization is not necessarily a normative good as it 
could lead to issues being ignored or depoliticized.14  This is because when an issue is 
desecuritized, high-level attention is taken away, genuine discussion of the issue leading to 
resolution is undermined, and affected communities are marginalized. While there may be 
cooperation when an issue is desecuritized, it could be merely tactical, with root causes of the 
conflict ignored and the asymmetrical advantages of the more powerful actor cemented at the 
expense of the weaker.15 
 The latter view seems to bear out in the China-India water dispute. Even though the 
dispute has been desecuritized, cooperation remains at the technical level, and is limited to an 
expert-level mechanism and a number of memorandums of understanding (MOUs) for 
hydrological data-sharing. There is no genuine discussion of the core issues, namely, the 
environmental impact of building dams and other infrastructure projects, and the fact that the 
water issue is inextricably linked to the border dispute between the two countries. Without 
addressing these issues, resolution of the water dispute is difficult. The findings of the Q 
survey provide some preliminary answers as to why desecuritization does not necessarily lead 








necessarily lead to a reduction in threat perceptions and an increase in trust levels, conditions 
which are essential for strengthening cooperation.  
 This paper proceeds in the following manner. First, we demonstrate how the Chinese 
and Indian governments have desecuritized their water dispute. Then, we show how 
desecuritizing the water dispute is contrary to the predictions of the securitization literature, 
and how material explanations do not provide an adequate explanation for China’s and 
India’s behavior at the river basin level. Next, we lay out the research design and explain the 
Q methodology, followed by presenting the findings of the Q survey. We then discuss the 
ideas that surfaced in the Q survey, how how they led to the desecuritization narrative, and 
examine the implications for cooperation.  
 
Desecuritization of the China-India Water Dispute 
Desecuritization is defined as “a moving of issues off the ‘security agenda’ and back 
into the realm of public political discourse and ‘normal’ political dispute and 
accommodation.”16 Rhetoric, discourses, and narratives are used to neutralize or reduce the 
security implications of an issue, and turning the issue into normal politics. When a 
government engages in desecuritization, the aim is to lower tensions with another country and 
prevent an issue from escalating out of control. For instance, during the spring 2010 Mekong 
crisis when water levels in the lower Mekong shrunk dramatically, groups within the lower 
Mekong states put the blame on Chinese dams in the upper Mekong. In response, the Chinese 
government engaged in several desecuritization moves and increased cooperation with the 
lower Mekong states.17  
	






 India primarily has three concerns with respect to Chinese actions in the upper 
Brahmaputra – floods, dam-building, and purported plans to divert the water for the Yarlung 
Tsangpo for the western route of the South-North Water Diversion Project (SNWDP). Indian 
newspapers and pundits have expressed worries that China’s planned construction of a series 
of dams in Tibet might be capable of diverting water and silt, and thus making these 
resources unavailable to downstream users. There are concerns over the environmental 
impact of Chinese upstream activities. On the strategic level, there are fears that China will 
leverage on its upstream position to gain concessions from India in territorial negotiations.  
 Local politicians and local ethnic groups in the northeast, the Indian media, and some 
pundits have accused China of being responsible for disasters that strike in Assam and 
Arunachal Pradesh. Their language follows the grammar of security. In India’s northeast, the 
constant flooding in the north bank of the Brahmaputra is referred to by the people living 
there as “China floods,” which lay the blame on Chinese upstream activities.18 Local groups 
have also accused China of weaponizing the Yarlung Tsangpo and painted Chinese activities 
as threats to the survival of the Indian northeast – for instance, the Secretary-General of a 
group of elders from the Adi tribe in Arunachal Pradesh said in September 2018 that “China 
is using the Siang as a weapon to destroy and devastate these regions of Siang and 
Brahmaputra basin… (italics added).”19 Chinese activities, particularly the building of dams, 
are seen by the media as threatening the Indian northeast. The Assam Tribune wrote –  
The Brahmaputra being the lifeline of Assam, any development indicating any 
aberration in the river system, especially in matters of water flow, is fraught with 
disturbing implications…It is a fact that China has been working on several big 
dams in the upper reaches of the Siang and there could be a link between the 






the Brahmaputra in Tibet by China for large-scale power generation and irrigation 
has to be regarded as a big worry for India in view of its adverse implications for 
the Northeast.”20 
These speech acts represent attempts by local groups and media to securitize Chinese 
activities by painting them as particularly threatening to the Indian northeast.  
 In response to these securitization attempts, China has simultaneously engaged in the 
three strategies Ole Weaver has identified as desecuritization moves, namely, to pre-
emptively avoid speaking about certain issues in security terms, to manage securitized issues 
in ways that do not spawn security dilemmas, and to transform issues back into the realm of 
normal politics.21 
 On the floods, China has sought to address Indian concerns by agreeing to share 
hydrological data on the Brahmaputra River and Sutlej River during the flood season. It also 
warns the Indian government ahead of time if a flood is expected. For instance, in October 
2018, a landslide in a village in the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo River, not far from 
Arunachal Pradesh resulted in a fear of flash floods in Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. 
China’s Ministry of Water Resources immediately took the initiative to inform New Delhi of 
the seriousness of the situation. A spokesman for the Chinese embassy in Delhi said,  
“After the incident, the Ministry of Water Resources of China informed the 
Indian side immediately and activated the emergency information sharing 
mechanism…The Hydrological Bureau of Tibet Autonomous Region has begun 







water level and flow rate…China is keeping close communication with 
India….”22   
 As for Chinese dam-building activities, the first major dam, the Zangmu Dam, was 
operationalized in 2014. Three more Chinese dams are planned on the Yarlung Tsangpo. 
Chinese rhetoric has focused on assuaging Indian concerns by repeatedly stating that the 
dams are “run-of-the-river,” meaning that they are not capable of storing or diverting large 
bodies of water. The Chinese have declared that the dams would not “impact flood control or 
disaster reduction efforts, as well as the ecological environment on the lower reaches.”23 
China has also put forward a positive spin on dams by saying that dams may help increase the 
amount of water during the dry season and control floods during the rainy season.  
 The assuaging rhetoric is most obvious during the spring of 2010, following an 
official Chinese announcement that the Zangmu Dam was being built after months of 
denial.24 When news broke in 2010 that China was constructing the Zangmu Dam, the China 
Huaneng Group, a state-owned company in charge of the Zangmu Dam, stated that first, “the 
river will not be stopped during construction,” and second, “after it (the dam) comes into 
operation, the river water will flow downstream through water turbines and sluices. So the 
water volume downstream will not be reduced.”25 During a China-India strategic dialogue 
around the same time, Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun assured the Indian 
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“the welfare and availability of water of the population in the lower reaches of the 
Brahmaputra.”26    
 On the purported plans to divert the Brahmaputra for the SNDWP, Chinese officials 
in meetings with Indian officials have repeatedly given reassurances that they have no such 
plans. These reassurances are repeated in the Chinese official media. A People’s Liberation 
Army Daily article, for instance, denies any diversion plans, and claims that China took 
Indian interests into account when it chose not to include the Brahmaputra in the SNWDP.27  
 The Chinese applied desecuritizing rhetoric even when they were using water as 
leverage against the Indians during the Doklam standoff. On August 18, 2017, two months 
into the Doklam standoff, India’s Ministry of External Affairs revealed that China had failed 
to provide hydrological data as required under the various MOUs. The Chinese Foreign 
Ministry did not acknowledge the data cutoff until mid-September, almost a month after India 
raised it. In its response, the Chinese government avoided linking the data disruption to the 
Doklam standoff and offered a technical explanation for the disruption. It merely said that the 
disruption was due to the upgrading and renovating of monitoring stations. Even though there 
is no official confirmation that the failure to provide data on the Brahmaputra was in 
retaliation to the Doklam standoff, both Chinese and Indian observers have linked the two. A 
Global Times article, for instance, reported the views of academics that China will not agree 
to all-round cooperation with India unless it withdraws from Doklam – “Although China is a 
responsible country, we can’t fulfill our obligations to India when it shows no respect to our 
sovereignty.”28  Moreover, the Bangladeshi government, which receives the data from the 
same monitoring stations in China, had confirmed that Bangladesh continued to receive 
hydrological data from China. That the data cutoff was deliberate is further confirmed by the 
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timing of the announcement to resume the data flow, which was in late March 2018, just 
before the Wuhan summit between Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi to “reset” bilateral ties.29 
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said, “On the basis of humanitarian spirit and our 
shared will to develop bilateral ties we will continue with the cooperation on hydrological 
information cooperation.”30 Even during this period of high tension between China and India, 
China had refrained from securitizing the water dispute, and linking the Doklam standoff 
with the water issue. 
 The Indian government has engaged in similar desecuritization rhetoric. As the 
downstream riparian, it has also not behaved like Pakistan as the weaker party in its relations 
with China; it does not use asymmetrical strategies and coercive bargaining against China. 
Instead, it has avoided inflammatory language, sought to calm the incendiary remarks from 
some Indian politicians and media, and downplayed the threat posed by Chinese upstream 
activities. During a meeting between former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Xi 
Jinping in 2013, Singh said that “as of now, our assessment is that whatever activity that is 
taking place on the Brahmaputra region in Tibet, it is essentially run-of-the river project and 
therefore there is no cause of worry on our part.”31 When news of the Zangmu Dam broke, 
the Minister of External Affairs said in a statement, “We have ascertained from our own 
sources that this is a run of the river hydro-electric project, which does not store water and 
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cause for alarm. I would like to share with you the fact that a large proportion of the 
catchment of the Brahmaputra is within Indian territory.”32  
 On speculation that China intends to divert the waters of the Brahmaputra, a former 
Army Chief, General Shankar Roy Chowdhury, said that the alleged diversion of the waters 
of the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River by the Chinese does not pose any threat to India – “even 
if China diverts water of the river, India does not need to worry” as the Brahmaputra has 
enough tributaries with adequate rainfall in catchment areas. 33  The Central Water 
Commission, India’s river water monitoring agency, said that there had been no evidence of 
China diverting water of the Yarlung Tsangpo.34  There are also constant reassurances to 
activist groups and local politicians in the northeast that the Indian government has 
highlighted Indian concerns about China’s upstream activities during meetings with its 
Chinese counterpart.   
 The desecuritization of the water dispute is puzzling when one considers that the 
majority of the disputes between the two countries have been securitized. For instance, when 
the Dalai Lama visited Arunachal Pradesh in April 2017, China strongly protested the visit, 
accused the Indians of reneging on its commitment to Tibet, and warned that China will take 
strong measures to safeguard its territorial sovereignty and legitimate interests.35 And more 
recently, in February 2019, during Modi’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh to lay the foundation of 
a new airport, he said – “Arunachal Pradesh is India’s pride…it is India’s gateway…And I 
assure you all that we will not just ensure its safety and security, but also put it on a fast track 
to development.”36 In response, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman reiterated that China 
	
32 Cited in Satu Limaye, “The Middle Riparian Quandaries: India and the Brahmaputra River Basin,” in 
Samaranayake et al., Water Resource Competition, p. 44.  
33	“India	need	not	worry	about	diversion	of	Tsangpo:	Ex-Army	chief,”	Political	Business	Daily,	February	4,	2018.		
34	Prabin	Kalita,	“No	evidence	of	China	diverting	water	of	Siang:	CWC,”	The	Times	of	India,	December	16,	2017.		





had never recognized the “so-called Arunachal Pradesh” and warned India to refrain from 
“any action that may lead to an escalation of disputes or complicate the border issue.”37  
Realpolitik dominates China-India relations. The two sides were at the brink of war 
during the summer of 2017 when military troops from both sides confront each other at 
Doklam, Bhutan. Relations have been rocky in the run-up to the incident. India views China’s 
blocking of its entry into the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group and refusal to name the leader of a 
Pakistan-based group as a terrorist in the United Nations as attempts to contain it. From the 
Chinese perspective, the “Indo-Pacific” strategy and India’s closer relations with the United 
States point to a more aggressive Indian policy towards itself. Such mutual suspicion and 
distrust are typical of the relationship between China and India. The historical baggage 
between them, unresolved territorial dispute, the 1962 border war, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama 
issue have led to a security dilemma that makes the two countries view each other’s actions 
as offensive and hostile.  
 The puzzle deepens as we consider that the tendency is for countries to securitize 
water disputes. As the availability of water is essential to survival, water-scarce countries are 
likely to present water as a security threat if it shares water resources with other countries. 
For instance, up until the 1990s, Egypt securitized the Nile River water as imperative for its 
survival and cemented its dominance in the Nile vis-à-vis the other riparian states through 
water agreements backed by the use of force.38 In the Middle East, in particular, water 
scarcity is often considered an issue of national security, such that resource management 





38 See Stephan Stetter, Eva Herschinger, Thomas Teichler, and Mathias Albert, “Conflicts about water: 
Securitizations in a global context,” Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 46, No. 4 (2011), pp. 441-459. 
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 Such moves to securitize water is not only a practice in the water-scarce and conflict-
ridden Middle East. In Asia, the water dispute between Malaysia and Singapore are 
securitized, with Malaysia threatening to “cut off” the supply of water from Johor state to 
Singapore whenever relations take a downturn, and Singapore making it clear that such an 
action is casus belli.40 India also securitizes water issues with its South Asian neighbors. The 
India-Pakistan dispute over the Indus River is painted as an existential security threat for both 
countries. It is also linked to Jammu and Kashmir, disputed territories between India and 
Pakistan – Jawaharlal Nehru had hoped that the Indus Water Treaty would eventually pave 
the way for resolving the Kashmir dispute.41  India has taken advantage of its upstream 
position from Pakistan to threaten Pakistan on the Indus, the latest being Modi’s suspension 
of talks on the treaty in retaliation for the Uri attack in Jammu and Kashmir in 2016 – Modi 
said “blood and water cannot flow simultaneously.”42 Apart from Pakistan, India has also 
securitized its water disputes with other neighboring states. For instance, it securitized the 
construction of the Tanakpur Barrage on the Mahakali River shared with Nepal in order to 
pressure Nepal and gain its support for the construction of the barrage.43 In the process, India 
secured favorable terms for itself, including a transfer of land from Nepal to construct part of 
the barrage in 1991. 
 The China-India water dispute also bucks against the conventional view that 
desecuritization is a normative good and likely to lead to cooperation.44 Desecuritization is 
seen as a move to open an issue into the ordinary public space so that as transparency 
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increases in the decision-making process, issues can be openly debated in order to allow more 
stakeholders to participate in the resolution of core problems.45 The assumption therefore is 
that states desecuritize in order to increase cooperation leading to the equitable resolution of 
an issue.  
 However, China and India clearly did not desecuritize in order to increase cooperation 
as desecuritization has not led to higher levels of cooperation. The two countries are far from 
coming up with an equitable resolution of their water dispute. There is no substantive 
discussion of the root of the conflict – which is intertwined with the dispute over Arunachal 
Pradesh. Both sides are wary of discussing the territorial dispute together with the water 
dispute as it will likely worsen the already difficult and fraught border negotiations.  
 At present, cooperation consists of a few low hanging fruits. An expert-level 
mechanism to manage the water dispute first started in 2006 and is chaired by representatives 
from the ministries of water resources of each side. By the end of 2014, the expert-level 
group has met eight times.46 Water is also discussed as part of the regular bilateral meetings 
between the two sides. The first MOU between the two countries on hydrological data-
sharing on the Brahmaputra during the flood season, ranging from May/June to October 
every year, was signed in 2002, and is renewed every five years. The catalyst for the MOU 
was a major flood in the early 2000s that killed 30 Indians and left 50,000 homeless when a 
natural dam broke due to a landslide on a tributary of the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet. At that 
time, many in India asserted that China withheld hydrological information that could have 
prevented the landslide. 47 Under the MOU, India has to pay China for the cost of data 
collection. China also agreed to share data on the Sutlej beginning from 2005. Another MOU 
was signed in 2013 to strengthen transboundary river cooperation in terms of discussing 
	
45	Nathan	and	Fischhendler,	“Triggers	for	Securitization,”	p.	22.		
46 	Liu Peng, “National Interests and Interdependence: China, India and the Case of the Yarlung Zangbo-
Brahmaputra River”, South Asian Studies, 4 (2013), pp. 33-45.  
47 Wuthnow, “Water Power,” p. 25. 
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technical issues of hydrological information sharing, monitoring and information sharing, and 
constructing hydrology models. In substantive terms, this MOU expanded data-sharing to 
twice a day and extended the data-sharing period from June 1 to May 15.48 The aim is to help 
the Indian government prepare for flood and droughts in the northeast. There are criticisms 
however that data-sharing should be continuous and not confined to only the flood season.49  
 
Existing Arguments 
 There are few explanations as to why China and India have desecuritized their water 
dispute. Scholars who tried to do so have focused on the material positions of the two 
countries. For instance, according to Sebastian Biba, China desecuritizes the river basins it 
shares with the Mekong states, Kazakhstan, and India in order to maintain a stable periphery 
for economic growth as China’s growing domestic water crisis has the potential to adversely 
affect relations with these countries.50 In the case of the Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River, 
China could not afford to completely ignore India’s concerns, given its three key objectives 
to stabilize its southern periphery, expand bilateral trade and investment with India, and 
reduce India’s alignment with the United States.51  These objectives are general and broadly 
apply to all aspects of China’s relations with India, and as such, does not offer an adequate 
explanation of why the water dispute is desecuritized while the other disputes between the 
two countries are not.  
 There are also scant explanations as to why India would desecuritize the water dispute. 










differential between them, which was clearly demonstrated during their 1962 border war.52 
However, India has not hesitated to undertake provocative actions against the Chinese, such 
as allowing the Dalai Lama to visit Arunachal Pradesh, and sending military troops into 
Doklam to stop Chinese road construction. Material explanations of desecuritization are 
lacking as they are only provide broad strokes of how China and India define their national 
interest. They do not tell us of the specific interests that China and India have with respect to 
their water dispute and how these interests are interpreted – “Determining what the particular 
situation faced by a state is, what if any threat a state faces, and what the ‘correct’ national 
interest with respect to that situation or threat is, always requires interpretation.”53  
 Likewise, securitization theory comes up short in explaining why China and India 
have desecuritized their water dispute. The theory argues that security is socially 
constructed.54 Threats are inter-subjective and discursively constructed by speech acts – it is 
the development of “a plot that includes existential threat, point of no return, and a possible 
way out.”55 The conditions that facilitate securitization are: (1) the speech act must carry the 
grammar of security; (2) the position of authority of the securitizing actor; and (3) features of 
the alleged threats that can facilitate securitization.56 These three conditions are present in the 
China-India water dispute and should (although not necessarily) lead to the securitization of 
the water conflict.  
 The securitizing actors of the dispute include local politicians in Assam and 
Arunachal Pradesh, journalists, public intellectuals, and anti-dam activists. The rhetoric they 
used fits the speech patterns of securitization – words such as using water as a “weapon,” 
“water wars,” “to destroy and devastate” are commonly used to describe Chinese actions on 









target audience of such rhetoric would be the Indian people, the Union government, and the 
Chinese government. The aim of these securitizing actors is to pressure the Union 
government to undertake stronger measures against China, protect India’s national interest, 
and the livelihoods and water-use rights of the people in the northeast, and for the Chinese 
government to cease their upstream dam-building activities and come to an agreement with 
India on water usage. Although the securitizing actors are not the Indian and Chinese central 
governments, the securitizing actors are in a position to securitize the dispute. India is a 
vibrant democracy with strong local governments which have at times acted as stumbling 
blocks to Delhi’s initiatives. Moreover, water under the Indian Constitution is a state subject. 
Local politicians have been able to exert significant pressure on the Union government in this 
area. For instance, opposition from West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banarjee has stalled 
the signing of the Teesta River Treaty with Bangladesh.57 While these securitizing actors may 
have the tools to securitize the water dispute with the Indian government, it is harder for them 
to impose the securitizing rhetoric on the Chinese government; however, the Chinese are also 
vulnerable to the securitizing rhetoric as their international and regional image may be 
tarnished if they were to act in ways that result in harming the communities living along the 
Brahmaputra.58  
 In addition, the features of the China-India water dispute make securitization highly 
likely. The intertwining of the water dispute with the territorial dispute, water scarcity in both 
countries, Indian dependence on the Brahmaputra’s runoff for water, Chinese plans to 
develop the Yarlung Tsangpo for hydroelectricity and for Tibet’s economic growth, and Tibet 
being a national security concern for China facilitate securitization of the water dispute.  
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 Of the rivers that China and India share, the Brahmaputra River is the most significant. 
From the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet, the river enters into Arunachal Pradesh as the Siang 
River before entering Assam as the Brahmaputra, and eventually merges into the Ganges-
Brahmaputra-Meghna River and into Bangladesh. It is the second largest of the world’s rivers 
in terms of drainage and home to approximately 40 percent of the South Asian population.59 
It thus has substantial portions of people dependent on it for their livelihood. Ecological 
sustainability of the Brahmaputra is an important concern. The river also has deep cultural 
and religious value.  
 For China, because the river originates from Tibet, it naturally becomes a national 
security concern; stability and development in the region are key priorities for the Chinese 
government. Development of the hydrological potential of Tibet is seen as a major boost to 
the Tibetan economy and Chinese economy in general. From the perspective of the middle 
riparian, India, China’s upstream position gives it substantial political and strategic leverage 
over India. This geographical advantage is further enhanced by the fact that China is ahead of 
India both militarily and economically. The building of Chinese dams in the upper reaches 
and speculations that China intends to divert the waters of the Brahmaputra further fuel these 
fears. There are also implications for India’s domestic stability in the northeast, an area that is 
politically and ethnically fragile. There have been high levels of public disapprobation of 
China’s planned cascade of dams in recent years, particularly in the Indian northeast.60 These 
criticisms are not just leveled against China but also against the Indian government for not 
doing enough to stand up to China.  
 The water dispute between them is also conflated with their territorial dispute, as the 
Brahmaputra enters India through Arunachal Pradesh, a disputed territory that China claims. 
	
59 Naho Mirumachi, “Securitising shared waters: an analysis of the hydropolitical context of the Tanakpur 
Barrage project between Nepal and India,” The Geographic Journal, Vol. 179, No. 4 (2013), p. 312. 
60 Pichamon Yeophantong, “River activism, entrepreneurship and transboundary water disputes in Asia,” Water 
International, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2017), p.176.  
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Despite being the upstream riparian, there also genuine fears within China that India’s dam-
building activities downstream would further strengthen India’s “actual control” over 
Arunachal Pradesh, which could complicate border negotiations and reduce China’s ability to 
regain the disputed territory.61 For this reason, in 2009, it opposed an Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) loan to India to develop the watershed in Arunachal Pradesh.62 These fears are 
clearly spelt out when a Chinese scholar with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(CASS), a prominent government think tank, wrote that the Indians have sought to firm up its 
control over Arunachal Pradesh by increasing its military presence, migration of its citizens 
into the area, and development of river resources, and area building dams in that area to gain 
an advantage in border negotiations with China.63 Another Chinese scholar wrote, 
Since South Tibet is still under the actual control of India, therefore from the 
perspective of China’s core interests, no matter it is by China or India, any form 
of development and utilization of the Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River must 
not threaten China’s sovereignty over South Tibet nor can it increase the 
difficulty of China in regaining South Tibet. Hence any action of India that seeks 
to enforce its control of South Tibet through the development of the Yarlung 
Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River must be opposed by China.64 
 As for India, it suspects that China lay claims to Arunachal Pradesh in order to gain 
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million cusecs.65 These suspicions were fueled by China’s move to block the ADB loan for 
watershed development in Arunachal Pradesh. India is also fearful that China will leverage its 
upstream position in negotiations over their disputed border. The conflation of the territorial 
dispute with the water dispute has made the water dispute one of the most intractable 
problems in China-India relations.66 From the Chinese perspective, “the resolution of either is 
the pre-requisite for the resolution of the other.”67 
 The lack of cooperation between China and India in managing their water dispute 
despite desecuritization seems to suggest that scholars who analyze riparian relations in 
material and power differential terms are correct.68 Miriam Lowi predicts that cooperation is 
least likely when the upstream riparian is also the hegemon, as the upstream hegemon will 
have little incentive to cooperate given the constraints it will face in utilizing shared water 
resources.69 When applied to the China-India water dispute, it would appear that China is 
responsible for the limited amount of cooperation since it is both the upstream state and the 
more powerful between the two countries. China certainly behaves as a realist power in the 
Brahmaputra River Basin, constructing dams and other infrastructure projects without 
consulting downstream states. It does not keep India informed of its plans to construct dams – 
despite months into construction, it had denied that it was building the Zangmu Dam. 
Moreover, the Indians have complained that the Chinese are not always consistent in 
providing data.  
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 Yet, there are flaws in the argument that cooperation is least likely when the upstream 
state is also the hegemon. China has desecuritized its water disputes with its neighbors in the 
Mekong, the Ili, and Irytsh rivers, and instituted cooperation with them at a relatively high 
level, for instance, cooperation with Kazakhstan over the Ili and Irtysh stops short of a water 
treaty.70  It has taken a limited sovereignty view with respect to the water dispute with 
Kazakhstan as there are ongoing discussions for a water allocation plan.71 Hence, set against 
the background that China cooperates to varying degrees with its riparian neighbors, there 
needs to be a better explanation for why cooperation is low in the China-India water dispute. 
The argument that cooperation is least likely when the upstream riparian is also the hegemon 
is narrowly focused on power asymmetries at the river basin level, without taking into 
account the context of the upstream hegemon’s relations with its riparian neighbors, and how 
ideas and perceptions matter in shaping interest and behavior.  
 
Why Ideas Matter in the China-India Water Dispute?  
 Why are ideas relevant and why do they matter to the China-India water dispute? First, 
ideas, defined as causal beliefs, are a primary source of political behavior.72 They are not 
merely “hooks” used by policymakers to propagate and justify their policies.73 Ideas are 
important because actors are normatively oriented – “Their desires, preferences, and 
motivations are not a contextually given fact – a reflection of material or even social 
circumstance – but are irredeemably ideational, reflecting a normative orientation toward the 
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coordination.75 They give rise to interest and thus shape state behavior. Interest is subject to 
interpretation and we agree with the view that interest is not always clear and stable but 
instead there could be a myriad of ideas on what constitutes interest on a particular issue.76 
This myriad of ideas among experts of the China-India water dispute on what constitutes 
interests and the best course of action to pursue these interests are captured in the results of 
the Q survey discussed below, and they help explain why China and India desecuritize their 
water dispute and why desecuritization did not lead to enhanced collaboration.  
 Second, as material definitions of interest and power differential analysis of the water 
dispute between China and India do not offer adequate explanations for the desecuritization 
of the water dispute, we should uncover the ideas and beliefs underlying desecuritization. 
Threats are inter-subjective and discursively constructed – “Even if one wanted to take a 
more objectivist approach, it is unclear how this could be done except in cases in which the 
threat is unambiguous and immediate.”77 As demonstrated in the above sections, threats in 
the China-India water dispute are ambiguous and subject to debate. There is a significant 
amount of speculation, rumors, and lack of information and knowledge on dam-building 
activities and river diversion projects. Under such circumstances, when threats are unclear 
and the immediacy of the threat is uncertain, and where information is incomplete, ideas are 
particularly critical for shaping state behavior.78  
 Third, as Manjari Chatterjee-Miller has demonstrated, ideas are also particularly 
important to China and India as rising powers.79 Ideas and beliefts are particularly relevant to 










would need to know what is the appropriate behavior for great powers.80 Hegemons care 
about their image.81  For China, in particular, the decision to desecuritize water disputes with 
its neighbors is very much tied to concerns about how countries around it perceive it, which 
impacts on its international and regional reputation. Apart from being an environmental 
security issue, water is essential for human survival and hence, is also about human security. 
On moral and humanitarian grounds, China could not be seen as completely ignoring the 
plight of those living in downstream countries. The emphasis in Chinese official statements 
that China is acting on humanitarian grounds for sharing information with India during the 
flood season shows that it recognizes that the water dispute is not solely a security dispute, 
but also an ideational and normative issue that could affect China’s trajectory as a rising 
power.  
 
Research Design: The Q Methodology  
 We contend that “interests are ideas, and ideas constitute interests, so all interests are 
subjective.”82 The Q methodology is thus well-suited for this study because the Q is the study 
of human subjectivity, defined as communication of a personal viewpoint.83 It is useful for 
uncovering and representing stakeholder positions and their interrelations through 
discourse. 84  It measures the perceptions of respondents and hence, is relevant to 
understanding cognitive structures, that is, how individuals think about the topic of interest. 
 The Q methodology is widely used in the fields of psychology, sociology, social 
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quantitatively.85 It goes beyond the usual quantitative tool bag as it brings qualitative research 
into the quantitative realm. It uses factor analysis to reveal groups of people and the views 
they hold. In narrative analysis, this shows the number of viewpoints that could exist in any 
situation – that is, the unique stories that different groups of people tell themselves. This is an 
important difference from ordinary regressions which focuses on the correlation of traits (or 
disembodied characteristics), with factors showing clusters of these traits. 
 In the Q, the variables are no longer traits, but the various persons who take part in the 
study.86 Instead of traits, the factors denote clusters of people - that is to say, each factor is a 
particular interpretive community of shared beliefs. Also, a Q represents a typology of 
perceptions, rather than a prevalence of traits. In other words, unlike normal regressions, “Q-
analysis does not yield statistically generalizable results. Instead the results produce an in-
depth portrait of the typologies of perspectives that prevail in a given situation.”87 This is 
useful for investigating the specific coalitions within the members of the public, experts and 
government officials. The correlations in Q reflect the degree of similarity in the way that 
statements have been sorted and the factor analysis of the correlations identifies groups of 
like-minded individuals.  
 The methodology typically employs a small sample of respondents, about 30 to 60. It 
is useful for studies that operates on a small budget but which do not wish to compromise the 
rigor of methods used. It consists of step-by-step procedures for examining subjectivity, 
perceptions, and the ideas/beliefs that people have. The main steps comprise the following:88 
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1. Creation of a Q-Sample, which is a set of statements that are broadly representative of 
the discourse or the opinion domain on the topic of study. This requires the researcher 
to be familiar with the narratives and literature on the subject. 
2. Administration of the Q-sort to respondents whose perspectives on the topic are of 
interest to the researcher. Each respondent sorts the statements in a quasi-normal 
distribution, placing each statement relative to other statements on a spectrum ranging 
from those they most with agree with and those that they most disagree with. The 
selection of respondents is based on including people whose opinions are either of 
practical or theoretical interest. 
3. Each respondent’s sorting of the Q-statements is called a “Q-sort” and factor analysis 
is applied to the sorts. In Q-methodology, the individual sorts are the variables and the 
Q statements are the observations. Correlation and the factor analysis of the 
correlation matrix is aimed at identifying clusters or groups of people who sorted their 
statements similarly, that is, they share similar view points. 
4. A few significant factors are identified from the weighted average sorts of different 
groups of participants, to characterize their attitudes, as well as the consensus and/or 
disagreement among them. Major “social perspectives” of the topic of interest are 
thus synthesized at this final stage.   
 In our study, as a first step, we combed through newspapers, both national and local in 
both countries, to identify the narratives and discourse that surrounds the Brahmaputra River. 
We focused on materials not only in English, but also local languages, including Chinese and 
local dialects in India. The ideas and views found in existing narratives touch on the existing 
policy priorities, central-local coordination, China-India collaboration, threat perceptions, and 
the effects of developing the Brahmaputra. From this initial list, we then draw up a list of 
statements that is most representative of the variety of views on the Brahmaputra. These fall 
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neatly into the three kinds of ideas that scholars have worked with: policy solutions; problem 
definitions, which is a way for understanding a complex issue; and public philosophies 
(zeitgeist), which is an idea of how to understand the role of government.89 These three sets 
of ideas are captured by the statements in the Q survey (see appendix 1).  
 In the second stage, we purposefully and carefully selected a list of participants, 
known as the P sample, and we invited them to express their degree of agreement with the Q 
statements. The P sample in this study consisted of 33 respondents from India and China, 17 
in India and 16 in China, who were experts on the Brahmaputra River, including retired 
government officials, academics from renowned research institutions, practitioners, and 
NGOs. While we do not intend to claim that the views of this selected number of experts 
represent the entirety of the Chinese or Indian population, we chose to target our survey to 
experts because while the citizen opinions are also important, expert opinions may be more 
comprehensive in the sense that not only do reflect government views or the views of non-
state actors alone, but the views of both on the subject. Experts may also be more 
knowledgeable about the government policies, strategies and overall issues regarding the 
Brahmaputra in these two countries that arise from their expertise. 90  Given the overall 
difficulties in accessing politicians and bureaucrats, experts in this field thus became the 
important and even the only source from which insightful perspectives can be generated. 
Having said so, experts surveyed here did not The participants were drawn from both the 
central and local areas, namely, Beijing, Yunnan and Shanghai in China, and Delhi, Guwahati 
and Assam in India. Nor do the findings of the survey suggest that there are no debates 
among policymakers and experts on how to best manage the water dispute. In fact, the 








experts surveyed. These findings are corroborated with journal articles written by Chinese 
and Indian scholars.    
 In the third stage, the statements were administered to the invited participants, using 
an online survey tool Q-sorTouch.91 The respondents were asked to order the statements of 
the Q sample into a quasi-normal distribution in the shape of a grid, which is an inverted 
pyramid of slots arranged along a scale ranging from a sentence that the participant disagrees 
with most, -3, to a sentence that the participant agrees with most, +3. The ranking is thus 
relative, forcing participants to rank the order in which they agree with the sentences, and not 
just merely expressing the extent to which they agree with them or not. The order set this 
procedure yields is known as a Q sort. The meaning of each ranking is only established 
through reference to the rankings of the other statements. We also included a few questions to 
learn more about the background of the respondents. 
 The fourth and final stage was to analyse through a by-person factor analysis to reveal 
correlated groups of statement preferences. We analysed the data from Indian and Chinese 
respondents separately, and then compared them. Analysis was conducted by Ken-Q Analysis 
software, a web-based application for Q methodology data. 92  For both data sets, eight 
principal component factors were initially extracted; among the factors with Eigenvalues 
higher than 1, three factors were kept using the varimax rotation, which cumulatively 
explained 70% of the variance for the Indian sample and 56% for the China sample. The 
significance of the factors is ranked in descending order, with Factor 1 representing the 
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 The factors that result from the analysis can be understood as groups of views and 
ideas on how China and India can manage their dispute over the Brahmaputra River. The 
identification of factors is based on interpretation of respondents’ reactions to the various 
statements, and hence in that sense, even though Q methodology is a quantitative method, it 
is subordinate to the broader analytical and interpretive task.  
 It is important to note that the limitation of the Q methodology is that it is primarily 
an exploratory technique. It cannot prove or disprove hypotheses. It can however bring a 
sense of coherence to research questions that have many potentially complex and socially 
contested answers.94  The Q methodology is thus useful for exploring the complexity of 
China-India relations, and specifically, their water dispute.  
 
Findings 
 We identified three factors on each side that are most representative of the views we 
have collected. The ranking of ideas represented by each factor tells us how interests are 
conceived by the Chinese and Indian participants with regards to the water dispute – the most 
significant factor, defined as the view of the largest number of respondents, is factor 1, 
followed by 2, and then 3. There were remarkable similarities in the ideas and views on both 
sides, although there were differences in the specifics. The group represented by Factor 1 on 
both the Chinese and Indian side believed that collaboration should be enhanced and that 
China should do more to assuage Indian concerns. Factor 2 on both sides focused on 
development, but they viewed the role of their respective central governments in developing 
Tibet in China, and Assam and Arunachal Pradesh in India as having different levels of 
efficacy. Factor 3 represented the group that viewed the Brahmaputra from a security 
perspective, with the Indian side seeing the threat as mostly emanating from China, while the 
	
instead,	we	 look	 to	 identify	 similar	 thoughts	 among	participant	 over	 the	 set	 of	 statements,	 and	 summarize	
from	there.	
94 Watts and Stenner, “Doing Q methodology,” p. 75. 
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Chinese saw the threat as emanating internally from within Tibet. Appendix 2 summarizes 
these views, the most significant statements, as well as the degree of agreement and z-score, 
which is a standardized measure of how salient the statement is to the factor.95 
 
Factor 1: Collaboration 
 The idea of enhancing collaboration figured prominently in the survey. On the Indian 
side, the group represented by Factor 1 strongly advocated strengthening China-India 
collaboration in terms of water-resource management, scientific research on climate change, 
and ecological and environmental protection, particularly at the national levels (statements 21, 
23, 25). They saw current policies, at the national and local levels as well as between China 
and India, as insufficient for protecting the environment and ecology of the Brahmaputra 
region (statements 29, 27, 1, 16). This view prioritized ecology protection above the 
construction of dams and other forms of infrastructure and economic development. The 
Indian respondents saw both the Union and local governments as placing too much emphasis 
on economic growth and development, and harnessing river resources for energy 
development. They felt that the benefits of growth and development did not outweigh the 
harm to the ecology of the Brahmaputra – they disagreed with “the benefits of building 
bridges, railways and other infrastructures along the Brahmaputra outweigh its harm on local 
environment and ecology” (statement 28) and “the benefits of building dams and hydropower 
stations along the Brahmaputra on local socioeconomic development outweigh its harm on 
local environment and ecology” (statement 27). This group also appeared to have greater trust 
in Chinese intentions when they disagreed with “dams constructed on the Chinese side will 
divert the flow of Brahmaputra and disrupt India’s water supply in the Brahmaputra region” 
	
95	“The z-score is a weighted average of the values that the Q-sorts most closely related to the factor give to a 
statement, and it is continuous. Factor scores are integer values based on z-scores and they are used to 
reconstruct the Q-sort of a factor, which is then interpreted.”  Aiora Zabala and Unai Pascual, “Bootstrapping Q 
Methodology to Improve the Understanding of Human Perspectives,” PLoS ONE, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2016).  
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(statement 31) and “containing and constraining lower riparian countries is also considered in 
China’s policymaking regarding the Brahmaputra” (statement 12).  
 The Chinese respondents in Factor 1 also emphasized the importance of enhancing 
cooperation. They disagreed that current levels of cooperation in terms of hydrological data-
sharing was satisfactory (statement 16). The Chinese respondents in this group strongly 
agreed that collaboration particularly on water resource management should be strengthened 
at the national level (statement 21), and also accorded priority to enhancing cooperation on 
climate change research and environmental protection (statements 25 and 23). They strongly 
agreed that assuaging Indian concerns that China would behave responsibly was very 
important for bilateral relations (statement 17). This group underscored the importance of 
collaboration and demonstrated sensitivity to Indian concerns when they strongly disagreed 
with “containing and constraining India on Brahmaputra is more important than collaborating 
with India” (statement 18), “building dams and hydropower stations along the Brahmaputra 
will not negatively impact lower riparian countries” (statement 29), and “it is not necessary to 
regularly update lower riparian countries about infrastructural construction activities along 
the Brahmaputra due to national security and/or business concerns” (statement 33). There 
was consensus with the Indian experts on statements 29 and 33. The Chinese respondents 
also agreed that “regularly updating lower riparian countries and infrastructural construction 
activities along the Brahmaputra is important for maintaining transparency in cross-boundary 
communication” (statement 32) and that the territorial and water dispute should be delinked 
so as not to impede China-India collaboration on the Brahmaputra (statement 20).  
 On the development of the Brahmaputra river basin, the Chinese side in this group 
held a neutral position on the benefits of building dams, bridges, railways and other 
infrastructure on the Brahmaputra while the Indian side disagreed that the benefits from 




Factor 2: Development 
  Like the view represented by Factor 1, the Indian respondents represented by Factor 
2 were also supportive of greater collaboration between China and India in terms of scientific 
research on climate change (statement 25) and environmental protection (statement 23), and 
thinks that reassuring India that China will behave responsibly on the Brahmaputra is very 
important (statement 17). However, they also differed significantly from those in Factor 1 on 
the benefits of development. They agreed that “the benefits of building dams and hydropower 
stations along the Brahmaputra on local socioeconomic development outweigh its harm on 
local environment and ecology” (statement 27) and “the benefits of building bridges, railways 
and other infrastructures along the Brahmaputra outweigh its harm on local environment and 
ecology” (statement 28). This group thus believed that development in the northeastern states 
was essential. They believed the Union government was not carrying out policies that were 
beneficial for and meeting the needs of the northeastern states (statement 13) and was instead, 
interfering with local autonomy (statement 14). The Union government was also seen as not 
doing enough to mitigate floods and other natural disasters, protecting local ecology, and 
water resource management – they disagreed with “Union government institutions have 
contributed to water resource management, disaster relief, and socio-economic development 
of the Brahmaputra region” (statement 15) and “managing and mitigating floods and other 
natural disasters is the top policy priority for the Union government in the Brahmaputra 
region” (statement 3).  
 Factor 2 on the Chinese side also held a “pro-development” view of the Brahmaputra. 
This group agreed that the benefits of infrastructure construction, including building dams, 
bridges, and railways, outweighed the harm on local environment and ecology (statements 30, 
28, 27), and that “boosting economic growth and socio-economic development is the top 
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policy priority for the Tibet government in the Brahmaputra region” (statement 8). Unlike the 
Indian respondents, they saw central government’s policies as being aligned with local 
developmental needs – they strongly agreed with “policies of the central government have so 
far reflected and addressed local needs (socioeconomic/sustainable development; flood and 
disaster mitigation) in the Brahmaputra region” (statement 13) and “cadres to support/aid 
Tibet from other provinces have contributed to the socio-economic development of the 
Brahmaputra region” (statement 14).  
 Compared to those in Factor 1, the Chinese respondents in Factor 2 tended to be less 
sensitive to India’s threat perception and needs – respondents strongly disagreed with 
“regularly updating lower riparian countries about infrastructural construction activities along 
the Brahmaputra is important in maintaining transparency in cross-boundary communication” 
(statement 32) and agreed with “it is not necessary to regularly update lower riparian 
countries about infrastructural construction activities along the Brahmaputra due to national 
security and/or business interest concerns” (statement 33). While this view would like to see 
greater cooperation between China and India in scientific research on climate change 
(statement 25), they saw development of the Tibetan region, promoting ethnic harmony, and 
ensuring the stability of Tibet as more important (statements 5, 6, and 8) than collaboration 
with India. They clearly prioritized business interest and national security when they agreed 
that “it is not necessary to regularly update lower riparian countries about infrastructural 
construction activities along the Brahmaputra due to national security and/or business 
concerns” (statement 33). The respondents in Factor 1 strongly disagreed with this view. The 
Chinese in Factor 2 also agreed with the statement that China’s “upstream position on the 
Brahmaputra is an important leverage for China in territorial negotiations” (statement 19), 
which those in Factor 1 disagreed with. But this group also disagreed that “containing and 
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constraining India on Brahmaputra is more important than collaborating with India on the 
same” (statement 18). 
 Respondents in Factor 2 thus reflected the view that development in Tibet and the 
northeastern states of India was vital for these regions. The Chinese side in this view tended 
to be less sensitive to Indian concerns than those in Factor 1. Their focus was on the internal 
development of Tibet and placed less priority on collaboration. With the exception of 
collaboration in climate change, they maintained a neutral or negative position on water 
resource management and ecological protection. They saw the benefits of development as 
outweighing the ecological costs.  
 
Factor 3: Threat Perceptions 
 On the Indian side, Factor 3 was a “China threat” view. They strongly agreed with the 
statement that China’s policies showed that “containing and constraining India is more 
important than collaborating with India on the Brahmaputra” (statement 18). This view also 
saw a close linkage between China’s upstream position and the territorial dispute between 
China and India – they strongly agreed with “China’s upstream position on the Brahmaputra 
is an important leverage for China in territorial negotiations” (statement 19). They saw 
China’s dam-building and construction of other infrastructures as having a negative impact 
on lower riparians (statement 29) and believed that the Chinese did not take into account the 
interests of the lower riparians (statements 17, 30 and 34). For instance, they strongly 
disagreed with “not harming the interest of lower riparian countries is also considered in 
China’s policy-making regarding the Brahmaputra” (statement 11). They felt that China 
should be more transparent in its policies and information-sharing with India – they disagreed 
with “it is not necessary to regularly update lower riparian countries about infrastructural 
construction activities along the Brahmaputra due to national security and/or business interest” 
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(statement 33), and strongly agreed with “regularly updating lower riparian countries about 
infrastructural construction activities along the Brahmaputra is important in maintaining 
transparency in cross-boundary communication” (statement 32). They were also concerned 
about the internal stability of the northeast – they agreed that “maintaining regional stability 
and promoting inter-racial, -caste or –tribal harmony is the top policy priority for the 
central/Union government in the Brahmaputra region” (statement 5) and prioritized the 
management of floods and other natural disasters (statements 3 and 4).  
 On development, they weakly agreed that the benefits of building dams and other 
infrastructure outweighed the ecological costs (statements 27 and 28) and maintained a 
neutral position on boosting economic growth in the northeast. They maintained a neutral 
position on collaboration on climate change research while disagreeing with the need to 
collaborate on ecological and environmental protection. As for water resource management, 
they weakly agreed that collaboration should be strengthened at the national level while 
strongly disagreeing that it should be strengthened at the local level.  
 On the Chinese side, Factor 3 represented a “national security” view of the 
Brahmaputra region. Because the Brahmaputra has its headwaters in Tibet, this view tended 
to see threats as emanating from within Tibet, and linked security and stability in Tibet to the 
management of the Brahmaputra. This group strongly agreed with “maintaining regional 
stability and promoting ethnic harmony is the top policy priority for Tibet government in the 
Brahmaputra region” (statement 6) and “mitigating flood and other natural disasters is the top 
policy priority for Tibet government in the Brahmaputra region” (statement 4). The emphasis 
on both disaster mitigation and maintaining ethnic harmony indicates that stability in the 
Tibetan region was the priority for this group. Lower priority was accorded to development, 
contrasting with the “pro-development” view of Factor 2. This group disagreed that boosting 
economic growth and socio-economic development was the top policy priority for both the 
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central and Tibetan governments (statements 7 and 8) and “the benefits of building dams and 
hydropower stations along the Brahmaputra on local socioeconomic development outweigh 
its harm on local environment and ecology” (statement 27), and expressed neutrality on the 
benefits of building bridges, railways and other infrastructure (statement 30). This view also 
expressed some support for enhanced collaboration between China and India – they strongly 
agreed with “in terms of scientific research on climate change, current India-China 
collaboration on Brahmaputra should be strengthened further at national platforms” 
(statement 25) and also agreed with enhancing collaboration in ecology and environment 
protection (statement 23) but less so in water resource management (statement 21). They 
agreed that existing territorial disputes should not impede collaboration (statement 20) and 
regularly updating lower riparians on infrastructure construction projects was positive for 
communication between China and India (statement 32). Nevertheless, these pro-
collaboration views were not as strong as the view presented in Factor 1. In contrast to Factor 
1, they strongly disagreed that “assuaging India that China will behave responsibly on the 
Brahmaputra is very important for bilateral relations” (statement 17). They seemed somewhat 
satisfied with the current level of India-China collaboration on sharing hydrological 
information and dealing with emergencies (statement 16). Clearly, safeguarding national 
security in the Brahmaputra region trumped collaboration with India in this view.  
 
Analysis: Ideas in the China-India Water Dispute 
 A set of ideas and debates have emerged from the Q survey that focuses on 
collaboration, development, and threat perceptions. The combination of ideas and views 
across Factors 1, 2, and 3 provides a plausible explanation as to why the Chinese and Indian 
governments have desecuritized their water dispute, and why despite desecuritization, 
cooperation between them in managing their water dispute is low. The myriad of ideas 
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presented here suggest that there was a salient view among Chinese respondents that were 
sensitive to Indian concerns and prioritized the need to reduce Indian threat perceptions. The 
need to build trust was also emphasized. These provide possible motivations for the Chinese 
side to desecuritize the water dispute. On the Indian side, the findings suggest that the Indian 
government is incentivized to desecuritize because the Union government in addition to the 
Chinese government are the targets of the securitization rhetoric of local politicians and 
activists in the Indian northeast. Cooperation is low despite desecuritization because 
desecuritization does not necessarily lead to a reduction in threat perception and contribute to 
greater trust. Thus the traditional view that desecuritization is a normative good and could 
lead to more genuine cooperation does not bear out. Only when desecuritization succeeds in 
lowering the perception of threat and resulting in greater trust can genuine cooperation ensue 
and root causes of a conflict dealt with. In addition, disagreements between those who favor 
development and those who prioritize ecological protection among the policy/expert 
community in both countries also impede cooperation.  
 
Ideas and desecuritizaton 
 Factor 3 represented the group of respondents who viewed the China-India water 
dispute as a security threat. While the Chinese side saw the threat as emanating from within 
as the emphasis was on both disaster management and maintaining ethnic harmony, the 
Indian side saw the threat as mainly external resulting from China’s position upstream which 
could be used as leverage in territorial negotiations. This group thus saw a linkage between 
the water dispute and the territorial dispute. The view was that China is using the 
Brahmaputra to constrain India and that China does not take into account whether its 
upstream activities, such as the construction of dams, will impact downstream countries. The 
Indians in this group also viewed the internal stability of the Indian northeast as a key priority. 
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 These threat perceptions make it easy for a securitization narrative to take place. India, 
in particular, may find it useful to securitize the water dispute as a bargaining chip against 
China. In fact, a report from a task force of the Institute of Defense and Strategic Analysis 
(IDSA) warned that  
It is important for India to create global awareness about the water resources in 
Tibet and build regional pressure. Tibet’s water is for humanity, not for China 
alone. Almost 2 billion people in South and Southeast Asia depend on the water 
resource of Tibet. Tibetans need to be also sensitised to the water resources and 
extensive ecological damage that China’s water diversion plans can cause…With 
Pakistan and China, water issues will be far more political and strategic. Water as 
an instrument and tool of bargain and trade-off will assume predominance 
because the political stakes are high. Water issues between Pakistan and China 
have the potential to become catalysts for conflict. 96 
At the minimum, there are some sectors within the Indian government itself that favor 
securitization. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, the features of the water dispute facilitate 
securitization. Why then has the Union government, like the Chinese government, made 
strenuous efforts to keep the water dispute from being securitized? 
 Analyzing the other two factors may offer some insights to why desecuritization was 
chosen instead. Critically, the perception of threat is much lower in the first two factors. In 
Factor 1, the Indian respondents displayed a higher level of trust towards Chinese intentions 
when they disagreed that Chinese dams would divert the flow of the Brahmaputra and disrupt 
India’s water supply and that China aimed to contain and constrain lower riparian countries 
by using the Brahmaputra. Indian respondents in Factors 1 and 2 did not seem as deeply 
concerned about China’s upstream position as those in Factor 3. For factor 2, respondents 
	




only mildly agreed that China’s upstream position is an important leverage in territorial 
negotiations while those in Factor 1 expressed a neutral position on this statement.  
 Views expressed by Chinese respondents in Factor 1 showed a level of sensitivity to 
Indian concerns that is at odds with the expected behaviour of the stronger party in an 
asymmetrical dyad. This sensitivity to Indian concerns provides a plausible motivation for 
why China desecuritizes the water conflict. There was strong consensus between the Chinese 
and Indian respondents in this group that building dams could negatively impact downstream 
countries, and national security and/or business interests should not prevent China from 
updating downstream countries on infrastructure activities along the upper Brahmaputra. The 
Chinese side emphasized the need to have greater transparency and information-sharing, and 
to reassure the Indians that China would behave responsibly. The Chinese respondents here 
were concerned with reducing India’s threat perceptions, which is in line with the 
desecuritization narrative. This sensitivity is clearly demonstrated when the CASS scholar 
wrote –  
The processes of negotiation and cooperation between China and India over water 
resources have shown that the characteristic of cross-boundary basins makes it 
impossible to view the water resource issues of international rivers from an angle 
of pure domestic sovereignty, but it must also consider the reasonable concerns of 
the lower course countries. Only then could the mutual trust and common 
development between the nations in the basin be enhanced, and their 
confrontation and doubts towards each other reduced… As for the negotiations 
between China and India, China needs to take a balance between the principle of 
absolute territorial sovereignty and the principle of fair use and limited 
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sovereignty if China is to consider from the overall diplomatic deployment and 
general national interest. 97 
In addition, except for Factor 2 on the Chinese side which mildly agreed (+1) that China’s 
upstream position was an important leverage in territorial negotiations, the Chinese 
respondents did not seem keen to leverage China’s upstream position to gain concessions 
from India. Even in factor 2, respondents disagreed that containing and constraining India 
was more important than collaborating with India on the Brahmaputra.  
 A clue as to why the Indian government favors desecuritization can be found in Factor 
2. Indian respondents in Factor 2 expressed a high degree of dissatisfaction with the Union 
government for the manner with which it had managed the water issues in the Indian 
northeast. They saw the Union government as interfering in the rights of the Assam’s and 
Arunachal Pradesh’s governments on water management and feel that the Union government 
had not addressed local needs in the Brahmaptura. This disapprobation of the Union 
government is mainly the result of the activities of non-state actors who sought to mobilize 
popular opposition against Chinese dams as well as the dams that the Union government 
wants to build in the northeastern states. For instance, by 2010, the All Assam Students 
Union and the Krishak Mukti Sangram Samiti, a farmers’ right movement, had established a 
broad-based resistance movement.98 Local politicians in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh are 
also responsible for whipping up these anti-Delhi sentiments. Besides questioning Delhi’s 
response to Chinese activities, they also criticized the central government’s dam-building and 
other activities. That the Indian Union government is the target of these groups, and not just 
the Chinese, means that there is incentive for it to play down the significance of the water 
dispute. Securitizing the dispute with China will put the Union government in a tough spot 
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between the Chinese government, and the local politicians and activist groups.99 The IDSA 
Task Force report hints at this when it said while the securitization of water increases 
political attention and public awareness, “there is, however, the risk that the issue can become 
vulnerable to political vested interests and linkage politics and solutions could be 
manipulated within the political context.”100 
 
Ideas and cooperation 
 The Chinese respondents who saw the need to reduce India’s threat perceptions also 
tended to prioritize collaboration. This linkage was strongest among respondents in Factor 1 
who favored assuaging Indian concerns and increasing collaboration in water resource 
management, ecological protection, and climate change. Such views on cooperation are 
supported by the views of Chinese scholars expressed in Chinese journals. For instance, the 
scholar from CASS argues that China’s reputation would benefit if it took a leading role in 
initiating basin-wide cooperation.101 Another scholar wrote – 
China and India need each other in their cooperation on water resources. To have 
conflicts on water resource issues is by itself unnatural and no matter who wins, 
both countries will be adversely affected. Hence China and India should enhance 
their cooperation in water resources and environmental conservation, establish 
reasonable water distribution mechanisms (italics added), so that there are mutual 
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Other areas where cooperation could be enhanced include the collective management of 
rivers and the chartering of international law.103 Given the strong emphasis on collaboration 
reflected in Factor 1, which represented the largest group of respondents, why has actual 
cooperation between China and India remain at a low level?  
 A holistic analysis taking into account Factors 2 and 3 helps explain the low level of 
collaboration. Higher threat perceptions appear to impede cooperation. Factor 3 which was a 
threat perception view tended to emphasize less cooperation. This was true for both the 
Indian and Chinese respondents in this group although there were differences in level of 
emphasis. There are three areas of collaboration which respondents were asked to rank their 
preferences – climate change research, ecological protection, and water resource management. 
Water resource management would be the most sensitive of these three areas since it involves 
riparian states accepting a limited sovereignty view of water resources that run through their 
territory. Ecological protection would be the next most difficult step for collaboration as it 
would also impinge on sovereignty since it imposes restrictions on how states develop their 
water resources. Climate change research is least controversial among the three possible areas 
of collaboration.  
 Indian respondents in Factor 3 expressed neutrality on climate change research, 
disagreed with ecological protection while mildly agreeing to enhancing water resource 
management at the national level. On the Chinese side in Factor 3, respondents seemed to 
think that current levels of collaboration at hydrological information-sharing was satisfactory. 
They strongly agreed on climate change research but placed lower priority on ecological 
protection, while only mildly agreeing that there should be collaboration in water resource 
management. Such thinking on the Chinese side is in line with the suspicions that the Chinese 
hold towards India. A key reason why China has been reluctant to step up cooperation, even 
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in the area of extending data-sharing throughout the entire year, is due to the Chinese belief 
that sharing information throughout the year would allow India access to monitoring China’s 
upstream activities all year round, which it deems as “provocative.”104 This contrasts sharply 
with the Chinese side on Factor 1 which strongly agreed with collaboration on water resource 
management suggesting that they took a limited sovereignty view of shared water resources. 
These differences between Factors 1 and 3, as well as the lack of consensus on both the 
Indian and Chinese side on areas of collaboration help explain the low level of cooperation 
between them.  
 In addition, although a development view of the Brahmaputra as captured in Factor 2 
appeared to also support collaboration, the level of threat perception among the Indians is 
higher here than in Factor 1. This indicates a lower level of trust and the Chinese in this 
group are less sensitive to Indian concerns. A lower level of trust and less sensitivity to other 
party could impede cooperation – the distrust between China and India has been described as 
a “key customary institution that affects cooperation.”105 Both Indian and Chinese scholars 
have expressed that this lack of trust is the chief obstacle to the formation of effective 
institutional mechanisms between the two sides.106 While the Indians in this group valued 
greater collaboration, they also expressed greater suspicion of China than those in Factor 1. 
They saw China’s upstream position as an important leverage for China in territorial 









Wei	Shen,	“When	do	 institutions	work?	A	comparison	of	 two	water	disputes	over	 the	Ganges,	Brahmaputra	




 Among the Chinese respondents in Factor 2, there was interest in collaborating on 
climate change research, but less so on ecological protection, and neutrality on water resource 
management. This group wanted to preserve China’s rights to utilize its water resources as it 
deems fit. It saw linkage between the territorial and water disputes, and agreed that China’s 
upstream position was an important leverage for China in territorial negotiations and that 
existing territorial disputes would impede cooperation with China on the Brahmaputra. This 
view is echoed in a journal article written by a Chinese scholar who asserted China’s right to 
develop its water resources and at the same time, advocated adopting a linkage strategy 
between negotiations on the border dispute and the negotiations on the water dispute.107 The 
Chinese respondents in Factor 2 were also less sensitive to Indian concerns when they 
strongly disagreed that regularly updating lower riparian countries on infrastructure 
construction is important, and agreed that the benefits of dams, and other forms of 
infrastructure construction would outweigh ecological costs. The Indian and Chinese 
respondents in both Factors 1 and 3 disagreed (more so in Factor 1) or express neutrality that 
the benefits of building dams and other infrastructure outweighed ecological costs.  
 The development versus ecological protection debate that is captured by the Q survey 
is part of the overall debate surrounding the water dispute. There are basically two groups 
with opposing views on how to manage the water resources. One group believes that the 
benefits foregone of not using water as an engine for economic growth have been very 
substantial, particularly considering the extensive and abject poverty of riparian countries.108 
The Brahmaputra river system is viewed by this group in both China and India as under-
exploited. 109  The other group argues that the current modes of development, such as 
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hydropower generation and river linking projects, are risky, unsustainable, and unjust.110 
Such opposing views help explain why cooperation has been low despite the desecuritization 
narrative. Disagreements between these two opposing groups within the policy/expert 
community on how shared water resources should be utilized is a stumbling block towards 
more substantive cooperation.  
 
Conclusion 
Material accounts of water disputes tend to paint these disputes in broad strokes, and do not 
reveal the nuances and complexities of water as an issue between states. The traditional 
emphasis on power asymmetry when explaining and predicting riparian relations does not 
adequately explain why states such as China and India have dealt with conflicts arising from 
disputes over transboundary waters in a variety of ways. This article offers a fresh 
perspective by arguing that ideas are essential for understanding the China–India water 
dispute. A set of ideas represented in the Q survey helps explain why, unlike the other 
disputes between the two countries, desecuritization of the water dispute has taken place, and 
why desecuritization does not necessarily lead to enhanced collaboration or genuine 
cooperation. 
Desecuritization has taken place, at least in part, because there is a salient view among 
the Chinese respondents that displayed relative sensitivity to Indian concerns, and which 
sought to reduce Indian threat perception. Chinese scholars have emphasised the importance 
of building trust on both sides, and desecuritisation is generally seen as having a positive 
impact on trust. On the Indian side, the Indian government could be motivated to desecuritise 
because the securitisation narrative of local politicians and activists in the northeast is also 





government aims to lessen the significance of the water dispute and reduce pressure on itself. 
Securitisation is not a viable strategy, because it would put the Indian government in a tight 
spot between the Chinese government and local groups in Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. 
The analysis also shows that desecuritisation does not necessarily lead to better 
cooperation because it may not result in greater trust and reduced threat perception, both of 
which are pre-requisites for higher levels of cooperation. Thus, the traditional view that 
desecuritisation is a normative good and could lead to more genuine cooperation does not 
bear out. While securitisation is generally seen as harmful because: ‘These alarmist views 
have hindered regional transboundary water cooperation with their popular “water wars” and 
“Chinese threat” narratives’,111 desecuritisation also poses dangers if depoliticisation takes 
place. As Weaver points out, desecuritisation that leads to treating an issue as a technical one 
may depoliticise it at least as much as securitisation does.112 This could obstruct the equitable 
resolution of a dispute, because: ‘Desecuritization processes which result in depoliticisation 
can be particularly troublesome in asymmetric conflicts’ since they could entrench the 
interests of the dominant party at the expense of the weaker. 113  The China–India water 
dispute is treated as a technical issue by both the Chinese and Indian governments because 
cooperation has remained at the technical level. The challenge facing the expert communities, 
therefore, is to keep the dispute politicised and relevant. 
The Q methodology has been useful in uncovering the myriad of debates and beliefs 
surrounding the China–India water dispute. Its value lies in revealing viewpoints and 
interpretations relative to one another. As a methodology, it can be applied to research 
wherein ideas and narratives are central to the argument. However, while it is useful as an 
exploratory technique, it cannot prove or disprove hypotheses, and hence cannot trace the 
pathways through which these ideas become important. The article makes up for this 
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limitation in two ways. First, by gathering the views of experts in the think tank communities 
of both countries, such as CASS, CICIR, IDSA, and top universities involved in research on 
the water dispute. These institutions are linked to the governments of their respective 
countries and receive funding from them. As the reports written by these experts are read by 
policymakers, therefore, they can influence the decision-making process. Secondly, these 
views are corroborated through the examination of journal articles and reports written by 
Chinese and Indian scholars. Such endorsement further underlines the importance and 
relevance of the views captured in the Q survey. Future research could make up for this 
shortcoming by tracing how and when these ideas become important. 
